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 Corporate governance (CG) has been a hot issue in Malaysia since the 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997
 In 2000, the government via the Securities Commission issued a 
Malaysian owned Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), 
modeled after the UK Cadbury Code (1992) and the Hampel Report 
(1998)
 It was subsequently revised and reissued in 2007 (following the Enron’s 
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case in the US in 2001 and the Transmile’s case in 2007)
 It was further revised and reissued in 2017
 The main focus of the MCCG (in fact CG) is on the board of directors 
(BOD) (esp. the chairmanship and composition) and the audit 
committee (AC) (esp. the composition and the qualification of the 
members)
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 Earnings management (EM) is a deliberate attempt by the 
management of a firm to distort the underlying economic reality of 
the firm (Healy and Wahlen, 1998)
 The main motive of managing earnings is to ensure the management 
reports the desired earnings for their own self-interest (Merchant 
and Rockness, 1994)
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 While earnings management, which is usually achieved either via 
accrual management or via changing accounting policies, is legal, it 
is considered as unethical as the main objective is to mislead the 
users of the financial reports or the stakeholders of the firm about 
the “true” underlying economic conditions of the firm
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 CG influences EM because the AC oversees the preparation of a 
firm’s financial statements and the BOD endorses the firm’s financial 
statements
 The general hypotheses – the independence of the BOD (and AC) is 
associated positively with the quality of the financial statements 
(usually proxied by the quality of earnings)
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 Currently, listed firms on Bursa Malaysia are traded on 3 markets (or 
boards) – the Main market (large firms), ACE market (small firms), 
LEAP market (SMEs, but their shares are only accessible by 
sophisticated investors
◦ i.e. high net worth investors - i.e. entities with total net assets exceeding RM10 
million (USD2.4 million), or individuals whose net personal assets exceed RM3 million 
(USD0.75 million) or whose gross annual income exceed RM300,000 (USD75,000) the 
individual concerned must have a total net personal assets exceeding RM3 million or 
its equivalent in foreign currencies)
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 Studies on CG and EM in Malaysia have focused on large firms (e.g. 
Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004, Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2016, 
Buniamin et al., 2012, Hashim and Dewi, 2009, Mohd-Salleh et al., 
2005)
 Large listed firms are closely followed by analysts and subjected to 
greater scrutiny by both the relevant regulatory authorities and the 
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stakeholders as opposed to small listed firms
 This could be the reason why the findings showed that 
discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) in large 
Malaysian listed firms are very close to zero 
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 Further, the listing requirements for listing on the ACE market 
are less stringent than the Main Market
◦ In fact, institutional investors do not have the mandate to 
invest in companies in ACE Market
 Hence, due to less public scrutiny, small listed firms may 
have a higher tendency to apply aggressive accounting 
procedures or accrual management as opposed to large listed 
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firms
 Therefore, since evidence on the role of CG on EM in small 
listed firms is non-existent (in Malaysia and elsewhere), it is 
of interest to study on the effect of BOD and AC on EM in 
small listed firms in Malaysia
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 The objectives of this study are:
◦ to determine the incidence of earnings management (i.e. 
the amount and direction of discretionary accruals) in small 
listed firms in Malaysia
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◦ to determine the influence of board independence and 
audit committee expertise in accounting on earnings 
management in small listed firms in Malaysia
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 Smaller listed firms are generally tightly controlled by families or 
individuals
 Therefore, the appointment of the family member of the firm’s 
controlling shareholder in the firm’s top management is common 
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(Claesens et al., 2000, Mok et al., 1992)
 It is argued that agency problem in these firms usually leads to the 
expropriation of wealth by the controlling shareholders at the 
expense of the minority shareholders due to weak investor 
protection (Cheung et al., 2006, Leuz et al., 2003, Fan and Wong, 
2002)
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 Evidence in developed countries reveal that private firms (i.e. small 
firms) have a higher tendency to manipulate earnings than public 
firms (large firms) (e.g. Burgstahler et al., 2006; Stockmans et al. 
2010; Hope et al., 2013)
 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) revealed that due to the less reliance on 
the financial statements of private firms in the UK, their earnings are 
of low quality compared public firms
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 Therefore, in the Malaysian context, it is predicted that the incidence 
of earnings management is predicted to be high in small listed firms 
as opposed to large listed firms 
 H1a. The propensity of earnings management in smaller listed firms 
is high
 H1b. Earnings management in small listed firms is predominantly for 
income-increasing
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 Board independence is the most important internal corporate 
governance mechanism of a firm
 Board independence indicates the extent to which the board 
is independent of its management and in the case of 
concentrated ownership such as Malaysia, board 
independence refers to the extent to which the board is free 
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from the influence of the controlling shareholders
 With the voting rights in the hands of the controlling 
shareholders, the appointment of directors to a board is 
usually dominated by the family shareholders who are also 
the controlling shareholders due to risk aversion (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Abdullah et al., 2012)
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 In family-owned firms, the main objective of appointing 
independent directors is to seek their expertise and advice on 
strategic directions rather than for control-monitoring purposes 
(Andersen and Reeb, 2004; Johnson et al., 2006)
 Jaggi et al. (2009) reveal that for Hong Kong firms, while board 
independence reduces earnings management, the association 
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becomes weaker for family-controlled firms
 Therefore, board independence is not expected to reduce earnings 
management in smaller listed firms in Malaysia because of the 
influence of family directors
 H2. Board independence does not affect earnings management in 
the smaller listed firms in Malaysia
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 Since the main role of the audit committee is to oversee the financial 
reporting process, having financially literate audit committee 
members is important
 DeZoort and Salterio (2001) reveal that the likelihood of material 
misstatements being detected and reported in a timely manner 
increases when the audit committee is comprised of members with 
financial expertise
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 Mohd Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) documented that when 
audit committee members are more knowledgeable, there is a lower 
incidence of earnings management practices in large listed firms in 
Malaysia
 H3. Audit committee expertise in accounting reduces earnings 
management
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 Sample
◦ Data were collected from non-finance firms listed on Bursa Malaysia 
ACE Market for 2012 until 2014 financial years, inclusive
◦ The data were hand-collected from the annual reports of the firms 
which were available on the Bursa Malaysia website
◦ As at December 31, 2014, a total of 107 firms were listed on the ACE 
market out of 906 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia
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 Variables
◦ The discretionary accruals were calculated using the modified Jones 
model developed by Kothari, Leone and Weasley (2005)
◦ The modified model is used because it incorporates firm’s return on 
assets, which improves the reliability as earnings management 
changes with performance (Kothari et al., 2005)
◦ In addition, the model reduces the problem of heteroscedasticity and 
misspecified issues (Sun et al., 2010)
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 Hypothesis testing:
◦ H1a was tested using a t-test to determine whether the 
absolute discretionary accruals were significantly different 
from 0
◦ H1b focussed on the direction of the discretionary accruals. 
Hence, at-test was used to determine if the “signed” 
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discretionary accruals were significantly different from 0. 
◦ H2 and H3 were tested using the following regression 
model:
◦ DACCit = α0it + β1.BODINDit + β2.ACEXPERTit+ ∑ βnXit + εit,
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 To address the issue of endogeneity in the present study, cross-
sectional two-stage panel least squares (TSLS) is used whereby in 
the first stage, board independence is regressed on the other 
independent variables together with lagged return on assets
 The predicted values of board independence from this regression 
are then used in the second stage in order to test the hypotheses
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 Both signed and absolute discretionary accruals were tested in the 
model
◦ Absolute discretionary accruals to test the propensity of earnings 
management 
◦ Signed discretionary accruals to test the direction of earnings 
management 
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 Out of a total 107 firms were traded on the Malaysian ACE Market, 
90 firms were included in the sample after excluding firms that 
were classified under finance or distressed (i.e. PN17 or GN3)
 After collecting data from the annual reports of these firms from 
Bursa Malaysia website, 255 firm-years with complete data for 
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2012 until 2014 financial years were available for analysis
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Variable Mean Std. deviation Skewness
Discretionary accruals (DACC) 0.6850 2.4443 4.6111
Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ABSDACC) 1.0589 2.3075 6.957
Board independence (BODIND) 0.504 0.115 0.357
Firm size (LNAST) (Log natural of total assets) 17.1154 0.9806 0.050
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.1832 1.4122 -11.949
Gearing (GRG) 0.1648 0.4568 8.986
Return on Assets of previous year (ROAt-1) -0.3327 2.1655 -8.282
Table I
Descriptive statistics (n=255)
Panel A: continuous variables
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Variable Mean t-statistics p-value
DACC 0.6850 4.562 0.000***
ABSDACC 1.0589 7.470 0.000***
Panel B: t-tests 
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
Variable 0 (No) 1 (Yes)
Big Audit Firm (BGAUDTR) 90.6% 9.4%
Audit committee expertise in accounting (ACEXPERT) 76% 24%
Family on the Board (FAMBOD) 75% 25%
Panel C: Dichotomous variables
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Panel D: Direction of Discretionary Accruals
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Number of firms Direction of Discretionary Accruals Percentages
230 Positive 90%
25 Negative 10%
255 100%
 Results in Panel A of Table I show that the magnitude of earnings 
management in ACE listed firms is very high compared to previous 
studies in Malaysian Main Board firms, both the absolute 
discretionary accruals and signed discretionary accruals (e.g. 
Abdullah et al., 2014, Abdullah and Ku-Ismail, 2016, Abdul-
Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006, Ishak et al. 2011, Mohd-Salleh et 
al., 2005 and 2007)
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 For instance, Mohd-Salleh et al. (2005) found that the mean 
discretionary accrual was -0.007, Hashim and Devi (2009) revealed 
that the average discretionary accrual was 0.133. Further, Abdullah 
and Ku Ismail (2016) found that the mean discretionally accrual 
was 0.0014
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 Evidence in Chinese listed firms shows that mean 
discretionary accruals were 0.007 for privately-owned firms 
(and -0.001 for State-owned firms) (Ding, Zhan and Zhang, 
2007)
 Hence, H1a is supported
 Panel B presents the results from t-tests for the discretionary 
accruals
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 Both absolute discretionary accruals and signed discretionary 
accruals are statistically and significantly different from zero 
and the sign of the mean is positive. Therefore, discretionary 
accruals are used by small listed firms to inflate earnings
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 In Panel D, out of 255 valid observations, 230 observations 
reported positive discretionary accruals (i.e. 90 percent). 
Hence, based on these findings
 H1b is supported where small listed firms have a higher 
tendency of managing earnings upwards through 
discretionary accruals
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DACC ABSDACC BODIND LEV ROA LNAST FAMBOD BIGAUDTR
DACC -
ABSDACC .635**
BODIND .028 .125*
GRG -.185** .057 .057
ROA .202** -.121 -.097 -.159**
LNAST .310** .005 -.072 -.203** .316**
Table II. 
Pearson’s correlation analysis
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FAMBOD -.001 -.070 -.314** .047 .052 -.018
BIGAUDTR .037 -.009 -.086 -.010 .048 .148* -.170**
ACEXPERT .069 .003 .011 -.112 .070 .032 .049 .091
Pearson’s correlation analysis
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
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Variable Predicted 
Sign
Model 1
(coefficient)
t-statistics Model 2
(coefficient)
t-statistics
Constant ? -6.1714 -2.8694*** -13.3797 -5.5464***
BODIND - -0.8105 -2.9937*** -2.0939 -5.9913***
ACCT_AC - -0.8237 -0.9580 0.0224 0.0210
FAMBOD + -0.2854 -0.6060 -0.0496 -0.0840
GRG + 2.5872 1.8112* -1.6784 -1.2275
ROA ? 0.7197 2.9008*** 0.1376 0.4923
Table III.
Results (Two-Stage Panel Least Squares Employing Random Effects)
Model 1: DACCit = α0it + β1.BODINDit + β2.ACEXPERTit+ ∑ βnXit + εit,
Model 2: ABSDACCit = α0it + β1.BODINDit + β2.ACEXPERTit+ ∑ βnXit + εit,
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BIG_AUDTR - -0.7080 -0.4051 -0.3394 -0.1547
LNAST + 0.5090 5.0142*** 0.9049 8.3210***
F-statistics 289.115*** 2475.02***
Adjusted R2 0.9553 0.9067
________________________________________________________________________
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
**Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
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 Results in Table III of Model 1 (i.e. using absolute discretionary accruals as 
the dependent variable) indicate that board independence associated with 
lower earnings management
 Therefore, H2 is not supported 
 Results in Table III of Mode2 1 (i.e. using signed discretionary accruals as the 
dependent variable) show that board independence is associated with income 
decreasing, which supports agency theory where independent directors are 
effective monitors of management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 Thus, combining the results in Model 1 and Model 2, independent directors 
are not only effective in reducing the incidence of earnings management, but 
they also ensure earnings are not overstated
 Hence, the appointment of independent directors to the board is not only to 
tap their expertise and to serve as “window” to the outside world, which is 
consistent with resource dependency theory, but also for monitoring 
management as argued by agency theory
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 Results in Table III for both models reveal that the presence 
of members of the audit committee who are competent in 
accounting is not associated with the extent of earnings 
management
 Hence, H3 is not supported
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 This evidence is consistent with prior studies in Malaysia 
involving large firms (e.g.  Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2016, 
Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006, Mohd-Salleh et al., 
2007, Ong, 2015)
 Therefore, having members who are expert in accounting on 
the audit committee do not appear to help to mitigate 
earnings management in small listed firms in Malaysia
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 Discretionary accruals of small listed firms are 
found to be very high, i.e. 0.6850, which is 17 
times higher than the average discretionary 
accruals reported by Abdullah and Ku-Ismail 
(2016)
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 Thus, the incidence of accrual management in 
small listed firms is more prevalent than in large 
listed firms
 Accrual management was predominantly income-
increasing as 95 percent of observations 
recorded positive discretionary accruals
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 The results indicate that board independence reduces earnings 
management and that board independence is associated with 
income-reducing accrual management
 Hence, compared to large listed firms, board independence is found 
to be effective in monitoring managers and also, board 
independence in small listed firms also deters overstatements of 
earnings
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 However, having accountant on the audit committee does not help in 
mitigating earnings management
 Hence, efforts should focus on strengthening board independence in 
small listed firms in Malaysia, for instance, by encouraging boards to 
be led by independent directors rather than just by non-executive 
directors
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